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COMMENTARIES
Influenza A(H1N1) and Pandemic Preparedness
Under the Rule of International Law
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD
ANOVEL STRAIN OF INFLUENZAA(H1N1) SPREAD RAP-idly throughMexico in April 2009 and now spansthe globe. By the time theWorld Health Orga ni-zation (WHO) was notified and had responded,
geographical containmentwasnot feasible, leading the agency
to call formitigation.1 Early indications are that the first wave
may not be as widespread or pathogenic as originally feared,
but this influenza strain could evolve to become more dan-
gerous in subsequent waves, as did the 1918 Spanish influ-
enza that killed some 50 million individuals.
The international outbreak of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) in 2003 and the more recent influenza
A(H5N1) among birds with limited transmission to hu-
mans helped prepare the world for the current pandemic
threat. SARS galvanized WHO to revise the antiquated In-
ternational Health Regulations2 in 2005, which took effect
June 15, 2007.3 Governments instituted preparedness plans
in response to avian influenza.4
Despite increased preparedness, WHO and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lack key pow-
ers and resources. Reminiscent of past responses, many gov-
ernments are acting out of fear or economic and political
self-interest rather than out of scientific reason. Above all,
there are serious questions of global justice, asMexicans have
become subject to stigma and discrimination.
WHO Pandemic Alert System
OnApril29,WHOraised thepandemicalert level to5, thesec-
ond highest level. The World Health Assembly revised the
pandemic alert level system in 2009, but that action has been
ineffectivebecause itdoesnot triggeragencypowers,andcoun-
tries are not required to take any action. The alert system is
based on geographic distribution of sustained spread among
humanswithoutdueregard to theactualhealth threatbecause
it could entail relativelymild disease. The threat level, more-
over, could heighten fears and cause the public to overreact.
International Health Regulations
Therevised InternationalHealthRegulations for the first time
inhistorypermitsanorganizedglobal responsewithin therule
of international law, andH1N1offers the first test of its effec-
tiveness.The InternationalHealthRegulations’ purpose is “to
prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health
response to the international spreadofdisease,”whilebalanc-
ing the values of human rights and free trade (Article 2).2
Emergency Declaration. On April 25, 2009, the WHO
director-general convened an emergency committee and de-
clareda “publichealth emergencyof international concern,”5
marking the first time adeclarationhadbeenmadeunder the
new regulations, which define a public health emergency as
an extraordinary event that constitutes a public health risk to
other states through the international spread of disease, po-
tentially requiring a coordinated international response.
Notification. In the early, crucial weeks of the SARS out-
break in 2003, China did not openly and promptly report the
first SARS cases.Consequently, the InternationalHealthRegu-
lations now require states to notifyWHOof all events within
their territories that may constitute a public health emer-
gency. The WHO director-general, not the state, has the ul-
timate authority to determine whether an event is of inter-
national concern. More specifically, states must report any
case involving a new subtype of human influenza.WHOhas
authority to bypass official state reporting and require coun-
tries to verify unofficial data sources and can harness new in-
formation technologies such as theGlobalOutbreakAlert and
Response Network. The mandate to report and use addi-
tional data sources strengthens WHO’s ability to track, ana-
lyze, and respond to emerging infectious diseases.
WHO Recommendations. A declaration triggers the di-
rector-general’s power to issue temporary recommenda-
tions. The director-general may also issue standing recom-
mendations on routine, periodic application of health
measures for specific, ongoing public health risks. On the
same day the director-general made her declaration, she rec-
ommended that “all countries should intensify surveil-
lance for unusual outbreaks of influenza-like illness and se-
vere pneumonia.”5 The director-general did not recommend
travel or trade restrictions, screenings, or examinations.
Human Rights. The International Health Regulations re-
quire states to treat travelers with respect for their dignity,
human rights, and fundamental freedoms.Although the regu-
lations allow countries to impose personal restrictions be-
yond those recommended by WHO, these may be no more
Author Affiliation:O’Neill Institute for National andGlobal Health Law,Georgetown
University, Washington, DC.
CorrespondingAuthor:LawrenceO.Gostin, JD,GeorgetownUniversity LawCenter,
600 New Jersey Ave NW,Washington, DC 20001 (gostin@law.georgetown.edu).
2376 JAMA, June 10, 2009—Vol 301, No. 22 (Reprinted) ©2009 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.
 at Georgetown Univ Med Ctr on June 9, 2009 www.jama.comDownloaded from 
restrictive, invasive, or intrusive than reasonably available
and effective alternatives. Generally, states cannot require
invasive medical examinations, vaccinations, or other pro-
phylaxis as a condition of entry for travelers or require health
documents beyond those permitted under the Interna-
tional Health Regulations.
International Trade. The International Health Regula-
tions, consistent with World Trade Organization rules, re-
quire trade restrictions to be based on scientific evidence
and risk assessments. Trade measures must be no more re-
strictive of international commercial traffic than reason-
ably available and effective alternatives.
Gaps in WHO Powers and Resources
The International Health Regulations, therefore, empower
WHO to provide leadership on public health measures. Yet
there remain significant gaps in the agency’s authority and
resources necessary for an effective global response.
Monitoring andEnforcement.Widespread failure to com-
ply with international norms was a key reason for the new
International Health Regulations. Yet the regulations af-
fordWHO little authority to monitor and enforce rules. Al-
thoughmost countries conscientiously reportedH1N1,WHO
has no authority to penalize for a failure to notify. More im-
portantly, the International Health Regulations impose bind-
ing limits on travel and trade restrictions, but many coun-
tries have flagrantly violated this norm with impunity. The
WHO director-general has power to make recommenda-
tions, but the InternationalHealthRegulations explicitly state
that those new recommendations are nonbinding.
Capacity Building. Perhaps the most important norm in
the International Health Regulations is the requirement for
countries to build capacities for surveillance and response.
Yet low- and middle-income countries lack adequate pub-
lic health infrastructures. Although the regulations encour-
age rich states to donate resources and technical assis-
tance, precious little has been devoted to build capacity in
poor countries. This places the world at significant risk be-
cause emerging infectious diseases often originate in highly
populous countries in Africa and Asia with close inter-
change between humans and animals.
Virus Sharing.WHOhas been embroiled in amajor con-
troversy with Indonesia for 2 years over its refusal to share
influenza A(H5N1) virus samples that are critically needed
to assess the threat of novel strains of influenza. Indonesia,
supported by many low-income countries, argues that it
would not be guaranteed affordable and sufficient access to
vaccines. The International Health Regulations do not af-
ford WHO authority to resolve disputes like these, despite
its importance to global security.
Gaps in CDC Powers and Resources
Most individualsbelieve thathighlydevelopedcountries such
as theUnitedStateshaveall thepowerandresources theyneed.
Yet, theCDCandstateand localhealthdepartments lackboth.
Althoughallothermajorcountrieswith federal systemssigned
the InternationalHealthRegulationswithout reservation, the
UnitedStatesgavenoticethat itmightnotcomplywiththeregu-
lationsunderprinciplesof federalism if apublichealthpower
belonged to the states rather than to the federal government.
The Canadian SARS Commission criticized the lack of le-
gal power and resources available to public health agencies.6
This resulted in fundamental reform of public health law and
an influx of resources. The United States, however, has not
learned those lessons. The CDC’s legal authority to prevent
the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable
diseases into or within the United States dates back to 1944,
but its critical powers—to quarantine, inspect, disinfect, and
destroy animals—have limited applicability to a few dis-
eases. If the CDC tried to exercise power, its legal authority
would be challenged, causing needless delays and uncer-
tainty, and its actionsmight be ruled unconstitutional. To its
credit, the CDC has tried for more than a decade tomodern-
ize its legal authority. But even though its proposed funda-
mental revision was submitted more than 3 years ago, regu-
lations have yet to be finalized.7
Federal and state legislatures have also allocated inad-
equate resources to the CDC and state and local health de-
partments. As the cost of health care has soared, only about
2.5% of total health spending has been allocated to preven-
tion and public health.8 A few states have strong surveil-
lance systems, but many others are deficient so that early
warning and response are highly fragmented.
Global Justice
Despite the InternationalHealth Regulations norm that travel
and trade must be scientifically well founded and respectful
of human rights and commerce, countries have imple-
mented numerous restrictions. Mexico has sustained severe
economic and social repercussions as tourism and trade have
sharply decreased; its gross national product declined 0.3%
to 0.5% in a matter of weeks.9 The media refers to H1N1 as
the “Mexican” flu.Mexicanshavebeen inappropriatelyblamed
and called unclean, and conservative US commentators have
urged tougher penalties against Mexican immigrants.10
Quarantine and Thermal Scanning. Asian countries pre-
viously affected by SARS have been most aggressive in re-
sponse to H1N1, although all regions have adopted coercive
measures.11 China and Hong Kong implemented quaran-
tines for travelers fromMexico,Canada, and theUnitedStates.12
Furthermore, 22 Canadian university students with no ap-
parent flu symptomswere held in a hotel inChangchun, a city
in northeasternChina.12 InHongKong, an infectedman from
an AeroMexico flight was isolated, while 300 guests and em-
ployees at the hotel where he stayedwere confined for aweek
under police guard.13 In Singapore, anyone who recently vis-
ited Mexico was placed into home quarantine. Additionally,
thermal scanners were set up at airports and hospital isola-
tion units in China and Singapore, where staff at emergency
departments wore full protective clothing.11
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Social Distancing. Social distancing measures have been
widely adopted, including closure of schools, public events,
andmass transportation. TheCDC recommended school clo-
sures for up to 14 days if a case of H1N1 influenza was sus-
pectedor confirmed. Before theCDCreversed its positiononly
4days later,more than700 schoolswere closed, affecting some
245000 children.14
TravelRestrictions.WHOsuggestedtravelrestrictionswould
have “very little effect on stopping the virus from spreading,
butwouldbehighlydisruptive to the travelcommunity.”15De-
spite this, many countries, including the United States, have
advised against all nonessential travel toMexico. Some coun-
trieshaveimplementedoutrighttravelbans.Forexample,China
suspended all flights between the 2 countries and chartered a
plane to pick up Chinese nationals withinMexico. Addition-
ally,LatinAmericancountries (Argentina,Peru,Ecuador, and
Cuba) suspended flights fromMexico. Countries such as Ja-
pan and Singapore have singled outMexicans for special visa
requirements suchas requiringamedical examinationoronly
accepting mail applications to avoid physical contact.
Trade Restrictions andCulling.There is no scientific evi-
dence that eating pork causes influenza. Yet 20 countries
have banned meat from Mexico, Canada, and the United
States, including 2 of the world’s largest pork importers,
China andRussia. In response,Mexico filed a statementwith
the World Trade Organization arguing that such bans vio-
late international trade rules. Egypt took the drastic mea-
sure of culling the country’s estimated 400 000 pigs, per-
haps motivated by prejudice against the Coptic Christian
minority (the primary consumers of pork).
Epidemics often bring out irrational fears and discrimina-
torybehaviorsamongindividualsandgovernments. It isall the
moreimportant,therefore,tohaveaninternationalsystemguided
by science that has adequate funding for research and public
health and that conforms to the rule of international law.
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New Guidelines for the Management
of HIV-Related Opportunistic Infections
Henry Masur, MD
Jonathan E. Kaplan, MD
THE YEAR 2009 MARKS THE 21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THEfirst meeting to draft an AIDS management guide-line for prophylaxis against Pneumocystis cariniipneumonia in persons with human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV) infection.1 In 1988, knowledge aboutHIV/
AIDSwas rapidly increasing, but relevant publications were
appearing in a wide array of journals that clinicians could
not easily track, and practitioners articulated a need to have
a concise, reliable summary of “best practices.”
The initial guidelines were developed by a group of ex-
perts from the major AIDS care centers in the United States,
who reviewed the literature, debated the issues in a2-daymeet-
ing, providedevidence-based recommendations, andpromptly
published their guidelines.1 Subsequently, these guidelines
were broadened to include prevention and treatment of other
opportunistic infections in HIV-infected adults and chil-
dren.2-8 As clinicians and publishers became more comfort-
able usingWeb-based resources, these guidelineswere posted
on theWebwith links fromWeb sites sponsored by theCen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Insti-
tutes ofHealth, and the InfectiousDiseases Society of America
Author Affiliations: National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland (Dr Ma-
sur); and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia (Dr Kaplan).
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